Logical knowledge has often been considered exceptional, either because it is a priori, foundational, or simply self-evident. Against this, some anti-exceptionalists argue that knowledge of basic logical laws is not acquired via direct access, but through methods of theory choice (e.g., logical abductivism). Here I investigate what such an epistemology of logic will mean for the debate between the logical monist and the logical pluralist. If theory-choice in logic is indeed broadly abductive, does that leave room for the pluralist thesis that there is more than one correct logic? I argue that abductivism might support a form of local pluralism, but that global pluralism is problematic.
Ole Hjortland is a professor of philosophy at the University of Bergen, and an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy. He has recently led the a four-year research project entitled 'Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic', funded by the Norwegian Research Council. Before joining the department in Bergen, he held research positions at the Arche Research Centre, University of St Andrews and MCMP, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. Hjortland is currently serving as vice-dean of research at the Faculty of Humanities.